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Myths about the "Revolutionary Proletariat"
in Developing Countries
by Raphael Kaplinsky*
In order to advance our understanding of social processes,
and especially their dynamics, contemporary political economy,
drawing on a wealth of 19th century literature, has focussed
attention on the meaning of class and the (dynamic) relationship
which exists between classes. Fundamental to this concept
of class relationships is the recognition that there exists
a process of exploitation within the production process - that
is, there are those who produce value and those who expropriate
the surplus. Cruder analyses of this type suggest that, in
the industrial epoch, there are two distinct and internally
undifferentiated classes - Capital and Proletariat. This class
relationship is considered to be dynamic in that, in the success-
ive crises of industrial capitalism, the proletariat (who
are the vanguard revolutionary class) will rise up and tIexprop_
nate the expropriators". By analogy, then, the class
relationships which arise in the industrial sectors of the
non-socialist developing countrieS are of the same type.
That is, the exploiters include the owners of the industrial
means of production, and the exploited include the proletariat
who work in these factories. It is thus argued that there
is an inherent tendency in developing countries towards
a socialist society, and at the vanguard of this change are
the industrial proletariat.
It will be argued here that insofar as it identifies
unionized industrial workers as the primary instrument of
change, this model is too crude for any meaningful analysis
of social processes - so much so, that it can often lead
us to incorrectly specifying the instruments of change.
While the need for a more differentiated analysis of dynamic
social processes in developed countries is now recognised,
the need for a reformulation of theory with regard to the
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developing countries is, if anything, more urgent. In
this article we shall concentrate on the role of the industrial
proletariat in developing countries.
Our reasons for rejecting the "crude" model as being
unrealistically simplified, are many and varied. First,
on the empirical level, there is little evidence that unionized
labour is a progressive force. This is not to doubt that
they do have great political power - witness the importance
of unions in the struggles for political independence from
colonial powers. Yet there is little evidence that this
political power is being used to usher in a more equal form
of social organisation.
Secondly, on the theoretical level, there are signs
that we require a more differentiated and sophisticated type
of analysis. A more sensitive and accurate approach requires
a number of distinctions to be made, especially those between:-
Unionized labour and the labour force. In some
industries labour has become unionized both because
of historical precedent and the nature of their economic
task. This has given them the bargaining power which
has enabled them to push up their wages at a faster
rate than those of non-unionized industrial labour
and agricultural workers.
Industrial workers and agricultural workers.
lt is common to find that industrial workers (both
unionized and non-unionized) have been able to advance
their incomes well beyond those of rural workers and
small farmers. This is a reflection of a number of
factors, such as the terms of trade between agriculture
and industry, organized labour's collective bargaining
power, higher value productivity of labour in industry(1)
and urban bias in decision-making.
Workers in different industries. Some industries
are more able to pay high wages to their workers than
other industries. This is for a variety of reasons,
such as differential rates of growth of productivity,
pricing factors (where increased costs can be passed
on to consumers) and low cost production (where high
prices, determined exogenously, exceed costs by a large
margin, e.g., wages in Zainbian copper-mines).
Racial differentiation. In some countries, dis-
(1) Although this is often a functIon of pricing policy.
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tribution (both of power and income) is patterned
around racial and religious factors The extent of
these inequalities can vary widely, but they find
their most extreme (and horrifying) form in Southern
Africa.
Distinctions of this sort are important if we are
to have a clear grasp of the instruments for change in
developing societies. Were we not to accept the different-
iated model, we might reason that unionized, industrial
labour, being exploited itself in its own work place, was
a progressive instrument of change towards a more equal
society.
On the other hand, it is argued here that, notwith-
standing the fact that it is being exploited, the unionized
industrial proletariat has managed to obtain wages which
are significantly higher than the earning of both agricultural
labourers and small peasant farmers. Their high earnings
reflect the rent derived from their bargaining power. The
industrial proletariat thus has its own surplus expropriated,
but at the same time receives part of the surplus which
is expropriated in other sectors of the economy.
Some explanation of these large differences in earnings
in developing countries (represented in this case by Zambia
and Ceylon) is necessary for an understanding of the role
of the unionized industrial proletariat. By definition,
unionized labour possesses a consciousness, sometimes derived
from direct political involvement in the struggle against
colonialism, but generally arising from conditions in the
workplace itself. Their position is a powerful one, not
only because of direct links with political parties, but
also because in a small economy which is putting great emphasis
on industrialization, the withdrawal of labour in one plant
can result in a significant loss in total industrial output.
Further, the price inelasticity of demand for industrial
goods(1) and the high level of effective tariff protection
means that increased costs of production can be easily passed
on to the consumer. Employers (state or private) have little
incentive, then, to keep down these wages. This is especially
true of large multinational corporations operating capital-
intensive plants, for which labour costs are only a small
fraction of total costs.
1) Which allows a collusive oligopoly to raise prices
without a more than proportionate decrease in demand.
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The empirical evidence at hand would seem to support
two contentions: that the unionized industrial proletariat
earns incomes significantly higher than most other income
receivers; and that in a situation of crisis, where the
existing system of distribution is threatened, it is quick
to rally round in defence of the status quo.
There is an increasing body of evidence that the dis-
parities in income in developing countries are of a magnitude
which corroborates the assertions made earlier. For example,
the structure of earnings in Zambia is as follows:-
TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS IN ZAMBIA 1968
Source: Repo'z-t .to the Goven.nmebvt o ZanibLc. ov IvtcomeA,
O)cgeA, a.vLd Pníces ¿i't ZambLa: PoUcy ctndMne't. Published b:, the Cabinet Office,
Lusaka, Zambia.
In a country with little shortage of land, there being
few landless labourers and a predominantly subsistence agric-
ulture, the poor class (outside of the urban unemployed
who are voluntarily in urban areas) consists of the peasant
farmers. It can be seen from Table I how great the disparity
of incomes is between these peasants and the urban workers
outside the mines (4.4 : 1). The disparity between the
peasants and the miners (who have powerful unions) is even
1argr (9 : 1). There is a sizeable gap also between miners
and other workers (2 : 1) which reflect the power of the
mine workers' unions.
These disparities obviously reflect changes in relative
bargaining power over time. In this case it is interesting
to note the changing balance of power, in that non-mine
workers have increased their share of the cake at a higher
rate over the period 1964-8 than the mine workers. But the
significant difference lies in the rate which the miners
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(1968 Kwacha) 1964-8
Zambian peasant farmers 800 145 3
Zambian wage earners
outside mines 270 640 52
in mines 50 1300 35
Non-Zambian wage earners
outside mines 22 4170 25
in mines 6 7600 16
Population Approximate Percentage
(000's) annual increase in
earnings real terms
(35 per cent) and the proletariat outside the mines (52 per
cent) together have increased their incomes relative to the
peasants (only 3 per cent). There is another significant
gap between the earnings of Zambians and non-Zambians in
all sectors, although the rate of increase of the latter
group was lower than that of the former. This reflects
differences in bargaining power over time of different racial
groups.
It could be argued that Zambia is something of a special
case. Due to the important role played by the trade unions
in the independence movement and the large surplus (derived
from copper production) available for distribution or savings,
the urban industrial workers (and especially the miners)
have been able to corner an excessive share of the cake.
Thus, it might be argued, in cther developing countries
the gap would be nothing like as large.
In Ceylon we would expect to see a radically different
situation. The government consists of a coalition of three
parties - the SLFP (Radical Nationalist Party), the LSSP
(Trotskyists) and the Cornrriunist Party. In addition, many
of the more powerful unions are affiliated to one of the
Trotskyist parties or to the Cormnunists. As is to be expected
with such political affiliations, these unions are verbally
"progressive" and campaign for the "equality" of a socialist
state.
However, a look at the distribution pattern in Ceylon
shows a wide disparity in income between these "progressive"
unions and the landless labourers. Assuming that the landless
agricultural labourer can get work for the full peak period
of labour requirements for two crops a year at Rs 5 per
day, this provides an annual income of about Rs 375 per
worker.(1) On the other hand the Colombo dockworkers earn
(with overtime) up to Rs 600 per month.
The differential in annual cash incomes is thus 19 : 1.
However, the differential in real incomes is substantially
less, but nevertheless still very large. If the free rice
ration is taken into account (approximately Rs 3.75 per
week for a family of five) the differential in annual real
income falls to 13 : I. But even if all the other aspects
of the extensive welfare system (e.g. free education, free
(1) Assuming that this peak period is 75 man days in all -
víd. R.K. Srivastava and S. Selvaratman, Eiiptojrneit.t SL&tcJÀon..o
ctd Tnd Ln Ceyon, 1971, p.28.
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health) are taken into account, the differential remains
high. U)
Another gap in cash (and real) incomes exists between
the unionized, agricultural (tea) estate workers and industrial
workers. Including all hidden benefits (such as housing,
health, education, etc.), the estate worker earns less than
Rs 100 per month. This gap in earnings reflects a number
of factors, such as different levels of productivity, differing
political power, and racial factors (the estate workers
are predominantly "Indian-tamils").
The major point of this article is that irrespective
of any radical ideology which the unions themselves might
hold, and irrespective of the radical ideology which some
ideologues would like these unions to hold, their objective
privileges in the system of distribution make it highly unlikely
that they will prove to be a progressive political force
in developing countries.
But it is not only the radical ideologues who see
these unions as a 'revolutionary force', for they are seen
to be so from the other side of the political fence as well.
Thus Galenson writes .. "it should be apparent that the outlook
for non-political unionism in the newly developing countries
is not bright (sic). We may expect, rather, a highly political
form of unionism, with a radical ideology."(Z)
However, having already achieved considerable political
power and great economic advantages, the unions are unlikely
to want to change the system of distribution. This was
so apparent in Ceylon this year, when the threat to the existing
system culminated in an insurrection led by the un-- and
underemployed youth. The reaction of the Ceylon Joint Council
of Trade Union Organisations was swift and the unions volunteer-
ed for service to protect the status quo. They then issued
a statement which attacked the insurgents as being politically
reactionary
"It is clear from the present insurgent activities
that the reactionary forces are making use of a misguided
section of the people to erase off (sic) the People's
However, if a more realistic estimate of the number
of days worked per year is assumed, (say, 150 days), the
differential in annual cash income is about 10:1. With
the rice ration taken into account, it falls to about 7:1,
still a sizeable difference.
W. Galenson, La6owt. ctktd EaorzomLc. Vevopmett, New York,
1959, p.8.
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Victory of May 27th, 1970. It is proved beyond doubt,
that the aim of this movement is to overthrow the
Government, so that the anti-Imperialist and progressive
measures taken by the Government like the abolition
of the Senate, introduction of a new constitution and
the Business Acquisition Bill could be thwarted...
"It is the bounden duty of the working class to defeat
these insurgent activities directed at overthrowing
the present U.F. Government brought about by the poor
people of this country and setting up a Facist dictator-
ship. Under the circumstances, the Joint Committee
of Trade Union Organisations calls upon the working
class and the people of this country, to rise to a
man in defence of the United Front Government and
in safeguarding public property and to extend their
unstinted co-operation in measures taken by Government
in the present situation."(l)
It is quite likely that there are unions in developing
countries which are objectively progressive. But equally,
there is no doubt that the majority of unions in high-
wage, high-productivity índustries are fundamentally reaction-
ary. It is not that the unionized proletariat is not
being exploited itself, but rather that it is receiving
incomes considerably in excess of average incomes, by virtue
of the rent accruing to its bargaining power. These unions
are thus in an ambiguous position - they both have their
own surplus expropriated and receive the benefits of surpluses
expropriated in other sectors of the economy.
Although these unions are prepared to press the system
to get a larger share of the cake (or to maintain their
share as prices and incomes rise), when a real threat to
the distributive system arises they are quick to come out
in active support for the existing balance of power. For
if the existing balance were to be made more equal, there
is little doubt that unionized labour, representing as it
does the relatively privileged elements in society, will
stand to lose.
(1) The Nation, Vol. V, no.26, 7th April, 1971, p.1.
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